The first notable utilization of a secondary device was during the infamous abortion clinic bombings in the 1990’s – at least for most of us today. With ongoing political and cultural unrest in the United States, now is an excellent time to bring a fresh look at our response to secondary threats brought by explosive devices and other menaces.

The Secondary Threat Described

I intentionally use the word “threat” vs. the more commonly used term “attack” because the Secondary Threat is not exclusive to intentional, planned outcomes. There are other secondary deliberate attacks or merely secondary results from the primary attack’s fallout. We should be conscious of all secondary hazards when responding to an incident.

Secondary attacks often follow an initial incident and generally target emergency responders and gathered bystanders at an incident scene. The most common form of secondary attack is a planted, self-detonating device near an initial incident site. 

Statistics suggest that secondary devices are present at half of all terrorist incident sites. Yes, the use of secondary devices has become a disturbing trend. 

Secondary Explosives

Intentional explosions are not as common in the United States as in other parts of the world, but these attacks should be a concern for just that reason. Intentional explosions do not occur frequently and often are not on our radar. 

We make this exact point can when we look closer at school violence. 

Conventionally the idea of school shootings being the greatest threat to people within our schools is inaccurate. According to the National Institute of Justice, shootings are responsible for less than 1% of school violence. Another misconception is school shootings cause more deaths within the school campus. Point of fact, the most extensive loss of life was the Bath Massacre. The Bath School massacre was a series of violent attacks perpetrated by Andrew Kehoe on May 18, 1927, in Bath Township, Michigan, United States. The attacks killed 38 elementary school children and six adults and injured at least 58 other people. The weapon of choice in these attacks was explosives that included Dynamite, Pyrotol, and Firebombs.

The second reason for understanding weaponizing explosive devices is the perpetrator mindset behind these incidents. If not solely cunning, they are intelligent opponents who can cause tremendous destruction of life and property. II can example people such as Theodore Kaczynski, aka the “Unabomber,” who began his reign of terror in 1978, concluding with his capture seventeen years later. Not only was he a cunning foe, but with an I.Q. of 167, he was considered a genius.

At an Olympic celebration on July 27, 1996, Eric Rudolph detonated a Centennial Olympic Park pipe in Atlanta, Georgia. The resulting explosion killed one and injured over 100. Rudolph carried out three additional bombing incidents between 1996 and 1998 in Atlanta and Birmingham, Alabama, killing one and injuring over 50. Two of the Atlanta bombings had secondary devices, timed to detonate after law enforcement officers and the media began to collect at the scene.

As we recently watched the bombing in Nashville, Tennessee, my thoughts brought the idea, “are there secondary devices in or around the primary blast site?” 

Secondary Chemical and Biological Releases

Explosives are common secondary devices; however, other secondary devices can utilize several designs and agents, including chemical, radiological, or biological releases.

As previously stated, the fallout results of a chemical or biological attack are long-lasting. These attacks within themselves may multiply casualties creating an impact for an extended period – even generations.

Secondary Non-Intentional Damage

We all are aware of the results from the primary attack on 9/11 in New York City, but what about the secondary damages caused by the attack – the non-intentional results?

One immediate non-intentional impact of this attack was the loss of equipment and people responding to the scene. Total destruction of 91 apparatus and vehicles, and approximately 130 more were damaged this day. Of the 2,977 people lost, 443 were emergency workers. 

I would be remiss not to mention one secondary result of this attack: the pulmonary issues that have taken many lives long after the attack. One could argue that this was not preventable, but it was. If all responders followed the breathing apparatus and mask protocols at the scene, we “may” have prevented some loss of life. Speaking firsthand, after witnessing the OSHA official pulling air samples at Ground Zero and realizing he was wearing a mask – I kept my facemask on at all times.

Mitigating the Threat

Create an Inclusive Plan

We must be inclusive in our thoughts and processes of the secondary threat. The secondary attack requires Secondary Threat Standard Operating Procedures to address this new hazard. Secondary threats require that emergency responders concurrently safeguard the physical assets, the public and protect themselves. 

In an active shooter incident, the first step for responders is to follow the “THREAT” protocols. I argue the protocols of the THREAT acronym should be followed in all intentional incidents.

T – Threat suppression 

H – Hemorrhage control 

RE – Rapid Extrication to safety 

A – Assessment by medical providers 

T – Transport to definitive care 

Properly Locate Non-Essential and Essential Assets

Consider secondary devices at the main scene and secondary locations near the primary site. If identified, such threats would necessitate broadening the threat area and require the rapid evacuation of some responders and all non-essential people. 

Controlling Logistical Responses

First Responders should avoid congregating in the same area unless otherwise instructed to minimize responder-casualty potential in the event of an attack. 

I have long advocated government services and our clients have a secondary location for essential and non-essential activities and resources. It’s at the secondary site, far outside of the primary incident location we locate media pools for public communication, personnel, physical assets staging, and operational command activities should occur.

Identify and Locating Secondary Threats

Observers

Secondary Threat SOP’s must consider locating secondary threats—placement of observers charged with overwatch of all incident areas for the safety of the response activities will help identify threats or vulnerabilities. Another duty of the observer is observances for secondary devices or the placement by suspicious people and people who do not belong within the area. Should the observer notice any of these indicators, they should notify the command for the needed order abandoning high-risk areas.

Sweepers

Sweepers are individuals responsible for searching suspected primary, secondary, and locations utilized during response areas. These individuals need training in performing their duties. Like previous training taught, they should be familiar with the search area or have outside people familiar with “what belongs and what does not belong” within the search areas accompany the sweepers. If hazardous chemical or biological devices are suspected, PPE should be utilized by all involved.

The sweep should begin at the center of the incident scene and work outward in concentric circles. Taking particular attention to trash cans, bags, backpacks, mailboxes, storm drains, maintenance holes, suitcases, parked cars, and suspicious individuals, all of which offer ideal concealment devices.

As a response increases in scope, the support area (or Cold Zone), where all staging, reception, and other congregational activities occur, should also be included in both sweeps and placed under observation for secondary devices.

Locating a Secondary Threat

Upon discovering a device or threat, you must immediately expand a “clear” space of at least 500 feet from the danger.

As with all responses to unknown devices, only trained, experienced, and adequately equipped personnel should disarm or handle any suspicious item found.

Alerting Others & Planning

In addition to your Secondary Threat SOP, you should have Emergency Planning in place. If you do not have the need or cannot retain a consultant, go online to research recommendations for your response to emergencies – at work and home.

Each device utilized brings individual threats and concerns. As part of your plan, the anticipation of alerting and evacuating small areas to complete communities needs consideration. 

Commercial and government agencies need to document human and physical assets within their geographical responsibility during the planning stages and update within the Emergency Plan or SOP periodically or as changes occur.

Hazmat incidents where airborne hazards exist require evacuation to locations upwind from the Hot Zone, following protocols of emergency agencies’ recommended practices such as FEMA.

Incendiary threats near utilities such as natural gas and other vulnerable utilities require we alert public utility authorities for mitigating further destruction.

Continued Wellness Monitoring

Post-incident, we need to monitor all exposed individuals, including first responders, for medical or psychological trauma and issues.

In some cases, where utilization of the material in an attack is unknown, or cross-contamination and long-term complications could be an issue, segregation to those exposed may be ongoing.

Monitor other health-related risks as prescribed by health professionals. In all cases, first responders should report to their physician their work and exposures for regular follow-up examinations.

Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is a real concern after experiencing a traumatic experience. I am not ashamed to share that, post 9/11, and after responding to Ground Zero, I experienced PTSD for the first time. Considering myself a seasoned professional with multiple experiences, I did not see this coming during a news interview with a news organization.

A final note, be aware that attacks often come rapidly and in immediate succession of one another – be sure to validate reports of Secondary Threats before unnecessarily alarming responders and the general public. The unneeded mental stress and fatigue caused can have short-term and long-lasting effects on those touched.