My Initial Viewpoints

“What we’ve got here is failure to communicate,” the famous line from Cool Hand Luke aptly describes the situation. These lessons are a stark reminder that in protection planning, communication is not just a tool—it is the lifeline that binds all other security aspects together. Without it, even the best-laid plans will fall apart.

Across all 12 points highlighted by the Senate Report, the common theme is that human and technical communication failures were central to the operational shortcomings that occurred. The lack of clear information flow, a unified communication system, and delayed or denied responses were vital factors that undermined the effectiveness of the USSS protection plan. These issues emphasize the critical importance of seamless, integrated communication in protection planning and execution. In complex operations, information from intelligence or on-the-ground observation must be relayed quickly and accurately to ensure that all teams can respond effectively.

The report comprehensively examines the multiple communication breakdowns and procedural failures during a security operation, highlighting 12 key points. These points illustrate how lapses in communication, as well as uncoordinated efforts, significantly hampered the United States Secret Service’s (USSS) ability to prevent an assassination attempt at the rally. Below is an analysis of these highlighted points, focusing on the crucial role communication—or lack thereof—played in the overall failures:

Delayed Information Flow

USSS personnel were alerted to a suspicious individual with a rangefinder near the AGR building 27 minutes before the shooting. Still, key personnel like the Lead Advance Agent, Site Agent, and Site Counterpart did not receive this information until after shots were fired. This delay underscores the inefficiency in relaying critical information, where communication failures directly impact decision-making. Had this alert been adequately transmitted to the relevant personnel, the response could have been more proactive.

Miscommunication Regarding the Suspect’s Location

The report indicates that a radio alert about an individual on the AGR roof was sent out three minutes before the shooter opened fire. However, this critical piece of information was not communicated to USSS personnel, who could have taken immediate action. In high-stress environments, especially in protective details, any delay or failure in communicating potential threats can lead to fatal consequences, as was the case here.

Lack of Immediate Threat Recognition

A USSS counter sniper observed local law enforcement running towards the AGR building with their guns drawn but did not notify the protective detail or move to secure the principal, former President Trump. The failure here highlights an internal communication breakdown between observation and action. The inability to connect visual cues with protective protocols—especially when a threat escalates—is a significant failure in communication and situational awareness.

Confusion Over Intelligence

The decision to assign countersnipers was based on credible intelligence of a threat. Yet many USSS personnel, including the Special Agent in Charge (SAIC), claimed to be unaware of this intelligence. This reflects a broader issue of disjointed communication within the protective apparatus. When intelligence and operations are not aligned, even well-prepared security measures can fail, as critical decisions are made without full context.

Absence of a Clear Chain of Command

The report notes that USSS Advance Agents could not identify who had the final decision-making authority for the rally’s security. This reflects a lack of clear leadership and poor communication about roles and responsibilities. Having a clear and understood hierarchy in protection planning is critical for swift decision-making, especially in fast-evolving situations. The absence of a clearly defined chain of command magnified communication failures, leading to indecisive actions.

Local Law Enforcement and USSS Disconnect

Local law enforcement raised concerns about resources for securing the AGR building, but these concerns were dismissed or miscommunicated within the USSS. A lack of coordination and communication between federal and local law enforcement led to gaps in security coverage. Collaborative security efforts rely on the smooth exchange of operational plans and concerns, and the failure to address this led to vulnerabilities being exploited by the shooter.

Line-of-Sight Issues and Mitigation Failures

USSS personnel identified line-of-sight issues at the Butler Farm Show grounds but failed to implement all proposed mitigations, such as positioning large trucks to block the view. While some USSS agents believed the mitigations were sufficient, the fact that multiple solutions needed to be employed suggests that key concerns were either downplayed or not effectively communicated up the chain of command. These issues further underscore how incomplete communication can lead to security oversights.

Separate Communication Centers

Having separate communication centers for USSS and local law enforcement, with no unified radio channel, made real-time communication cumbersome. This separation created information silos, where critical details like the identification of an armed suspect were delayed or lost in transmission. A unified command system and communication network would have allowed for more coordinated and faster responses.

Split-Second Decision-Making

USSS counter snipers had mere seconds to decide to fire, which they executed without requiring permission. While this might have been the correct action in the moment, it highlights a system where rapid communication was both necessary and absent. The need for immediate, clear directives in such situations shows the importance of an integrated communication strategy for quick threat assessment and decision-making.

Denied Requests for Additional Resources

USSS Advance Agents requested resources, such as Counter Assault Team liaisons and additional C-UAS equipment, but these were denied without explanation. Denying such requests, especially without communicating the rationale, limits operational effectiveness and reflects a broader failure in logistical communication. When frontline agents are denied critical resources, it inhibits their ability to fully secure an area, leaving gaps that can be exploited.

C-UAS System Malfunctions

The report mentions technical issues with the USSS C-UAS system, which left it inoperable for several hours. The agent in charge had to troubleshoot by calling a tech support hotline, further delaying the resolution. The fact that this technical failure was not communicated effectively to the security team and a lack of backup systems demonstrates how communication failures compounded an already difficult situation.

Radio Problems and Lack of Communication Tools

Many USSS officials reported issues with their radios, which the report indicates are common during USSS operations. This directly impacts the effectiveness of real-time communication. Additionally, the SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office, who acted as a liaison, needed a working radio, further limiting his ability to communicate with other USSS personnel during the rally. In protective operations, where seconds can mean the difference between life and death, such technical problems should have been preemptively addressed through better planning and testing.

These viewpoints represent the first brush of the interim report from the committee, focusing on communication breakdowns and their impact on protection planning. With additional information forthcoming, including incidents such as the attempted assassination on September 14, 2024, further updates will be provided to address emerging concerns.

It is important to emphasize that this analysis is not intended to second-guess or “quarterback” the actions of the Secret Service. Instead, it is meant to serve as a learning tool for those in the security and protection fields who may benefit from understanding how communication plays a critical role in operational success and failure. As more information becomes available, updates will be integrated to refine these insights.

The Full Senate Interim Report